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Key Issues R I S K  M A N A G E M E N T
• Agreement by G20 to adopt a raft of
measures to strengthen global finance
system
• Vital for boards to be aware of risk
issues as they relate to individual
companies
• Inevitable that regulation will be
tightened — the challenge is to ensure
that lasting benefits ensue
The causes of the global financial crisis arecomplex and multidimensional. A
combination of factors including low interest
rates, highly complex financial products, poor risk
management and excessive incentive schemes
contributed to the spectacular failure of many
financial institutions, which in turn has damaged
the wider international economy.
The long-term policy response to deal with the
crisis has focused on issues of transparency,
disclosure, and risk management. The coordinated
global effort to rebuild the financial system and
restore economic growth has three essential
dimensions:
• containing the contagion and restoring market
operations
• coping with long-term systemic problems
• aligning international regulation and oversight
of financial institutions.1
The most serious financial crisis since the
1930s Great Depression will elicit the most
comprehensive and robust international
regulatory response, comparable in influence to
the Glass-Steagall Act 1932, and the Securities Acts
of 1933 and 1934. However though the financial
crisis originated in US investment banks, it has
resonated across the world, and the regulatory
response requires international coordination. This
regulatory response is still emerging and will take
years to complete. However, substantial policy
foundations are already in place.
The principles of the G20 countries directed at
reform of financial markets include:
• enhancing disclosure on complex financial
products and aligning incentives to avoid
excessive risk-taking
• strengthening regulatory regimes, prudential
oversight and risk management
• protecting the integrity of financial markets,
and promoting information sharing
• formulating consistent global regulations and
practices (for example in accounting, auditing
and deposit insurance) and 
• reforming international financial institutions. 
This will amount to a comprehensive reform
of the Bretton Woods institutions to reflect the
transformation in the international economy 
(see Table 1).
The ultimate objectives of the G20 in reforming
the international financial system are to:
• avoid regulatory policies that exacerbate the
ups and downs of the business cycle
• review and align global accounting standards,
particularly for complex securities in times of
stress
• strengthen the transparency of credit
derivatives markets and reduce their 
systemic risks
• review incentives for risk-taking and
innovation reflected in compensation practices
and
• review the mandates, governance, and
resource requirements of international
financial institutions.2
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Formulate consistent global regulations
Reforming international financial
institutions
Advance the reform of Bretton Woods
institutions to reflect changing economic
weight
Immediate actions by 
31 March 2009
• Enhance guidance for disclosing the
valuation of complex, illiquid
securities
• Enhance governance of international
accounting standard-setting bodies
• Assess private sector best practice for
private pools of capital and / or
hedge funds
• Regulatory regimes — Review
procyclicality, including the ways
that valuation, leverage, bank
capital, executive compensation and
loss provisioning exacerbate
cyclicality
• Prudential oversight — Enhance
international standards and minimise
conflicts for ratings agencies; ensure
maintenance of adequate capital,
speed efforts to implement central
counterparty services
• Risk management — Re-examine bank
risk management and internal
controls, in particular relating to
liquidity and counterparty risk, stress
testing, incentive alignment and
development of structured products
• Enhance regional/international
regulatory cooperation
• Promote information sharing on
threats to market stability; ensure
legal provisions to address threats
• Review business conduct rules to
protect markets and investors against
market manipulation and fraud




• Strengthen cross-border crisis
management procedures and
conduct simulation exercises
• Add emerging economies to
Financial Stability Forum
• Strengthen IMF and FSF
collaboration on surveillance and
standard setting, respectively
• Review resource adequacy of
development banks
• Review ways to restore access to
credit and resume private capital
flows to emerging economies
Medium-term actions
• Create single, high quality global
accounting standard
• Ensure that regulators, supervisors,
accounting standard setters and the
private sector work more closely
together on consistent application
and enforcement of standards
• Enhance financial institution risk and
loss disclosures including off-balance
sheet activities
• Regulatory regimes — Undertake
Financial Sector Assessment Program
with view to ensuring that all
systemically important institutions
are appropriately regulated
• Prudential oversight — Register credit
rating agencies; develop robust
international framework for bank
liquidity management and central
bank intervention
• Risk management — Ensure
awareness and ability to respond to
evolving financial markets and
products; monitor substantial
changes in assets prices and their
implications for the macro-
economy/financial system
• Implement measures that protect
against uncooperative and/or non-
transparent jurisdictions posing
systemic risks
• Continue work against money
laundering and terrorist financing
• Promote international tax
information exchange
• Collect information on areas of
convergence in regulatory practices
(for example, accounting, auditing,
deposit insurance) to accelerate
progress where necessary
• Ensure that temporary measures to
restore stability and confidence
create minimal distortions
• Comprehensively reform Bretton
Woods institutions so they can more
adequately reflect changing
international economic weights and
effectively respond to future
challenges
• IMF should contact surveillance
reviews of all countries
• Provide capacity-building programs
for emerging economies on the
formulation of effective regulation
Source: US Executive Office of the President, 2009
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In this article we focus on the corporate
governance issues revealed by the crisis and how
they might be remedied. We concentrate on three
areas that will affect the governance of all
companies not just those in the financial sector:
risk management, executive remuneration and
disclosure. Running parallel to this are
investigations into how prudential regulation and
accounting standards may have failed to keep up
with financial innovation. A recent OECD report
highlights the governance failures at the heart of
the crisis:
The financial crisis can be to an important extent
attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate
governance arrangements which did not serve
their purpose to safeguard against excessive risk
taking in a number of financial services
companies... Accounting standards and regulatory
requirements have also proved insufficient in
some areas. Last but not least, remuneration
systems have in a number of cases not been
closely related to the strategy and risk appetite of
the company and its longer term interests.3
Origins and causes of the crisis
If the original causes of the global financial crisis
were rampant global liquidity, reckless financial
innovation and misaligned incentives, these were
compounded immeasurably by weak regulatory
frameworks, inadequate corporate governance and
marginalised risk management.4 An OECD report
recognises a process of deregulation that
accommodated the new banking business model,
and identifies four specific factors in 2004 that set
the scene for the disaster to come.
• The Bush administration introduced ‘American
Dream’ legislation that facilitated zero equity
mortgages, extending loans to those without
the means to repay them.
• Greater capital requirements were imposed on
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two
government-sponsored mortgage giants,
opening the way for many other banks to
provide sub-prime mortgages.
• The Basel II accord on international bank
regulation created an opportunity for banks to
accelerate off-balance-sheet activity.
• The SEC allowed investment banks to manage
their risk using less stringent calculations, that
allowed them to increase their leverage ratio
towards 40:1.5
As a Securities Industries report accepted:
The new banking business model encouraged the
development of increasingly complex financial
products such as collateralized debt obligations of
asset backed securities (CDOs of ABS), CDOs of
CDOs (CDOs-squared), and constant proportion
debt obligations (CPDOs). These exceeded the
analytical and risk management capabilities of
even some of the most sophisticated market
participants. The same dealers who structured
these securities have borne several hundred
billion dollars in losses to date, suggesting that
even they did not fully understand or were
unable to monitor and manage the risks
embedded in these highly complex products.6
Effectively this amounted to a critical failure
in corporate governance and risk management.
The OECD places a good deal of blame on boards
of directors for failing to properly supervise risk
management and incentive systems.7 It identifies
credit rating agencies, disclosure regimes and
accounting standards as contributing to the
problem but considers that a good board ought to
have been able to overcome these weaknesses.
[There were] significant failures of risk
management systems in some major financial
institutions made worse by incentive systems that
encouraged and rewarded high levels of risk
taking. Since reviewing and guiding risk policy is
a key function of the board, these deficiencies
point to ineffective board oversight.8
The emerging regulatory order
Suddenly regulatory inadequacy, rather than over-
regulation was the focus of world attention, and
Australia’s twin peaks regulation with ASIC
responsible for corporate governance and APRA
for prudential regulation appeared to many a
more effective system than the hopelessly
fragmented approach of the US, or the heavily
integrated Financial Services Authority in the UK
(see Table 2). Amid the enveloping financial
chaos, the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
gave a prescient outline of the necessary basis of a
new regulatory order at the United Nations.
• First, systemically important financial
institutions should be licensed to operate in
major economies only under the condition
that they make full disclosure and analysis of
balance sheet and off-balance sheet exposures.
• Second, we need to ensure that banks and
other financial institutions build up capital in
good times as a buffer for the bad times, using
predictable rules.
• Third, financial institutions need to have clear
incentives which promote responsible
behaviour, rather than unrestrained greed.
• Fourth, supervisory systems must be
compatible with accounting principles that
reflect reasonable assessments of the value of
assets over time.
• And fifth, the IMF should be given a
strengthened mandate for prudential analysis.9
After a succession of earlier meetings on the
crisis, the members of the G20 in London in April
2009 agreed a series of regulatory measures to
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strengthen the financial system and a timetable for
implementation. A new Financial Stability Board
was established, a successor to the Financial Stability
Forum (FSF), which together with the IMF will
monitor progress and provide a report to the next
meeting of Finance Ministers in November 2009.
The regulatory measures include:
• reshaping regulatory systems so that authorities
can identify and take account of macro-
prudential risks
• extending regulation and oversight to all
systemically important financial institutions,
instruments and markets including, for the first
time, hedge funds. The IMF and FSB are to
produce guidelines on whether a financial
institution, instrument or market is ‘systemically
important’ by the next meeting of Finance
Ministers. Hedge funds or their managers are to
be registered and will be required to disclose
appropriate information on an ongoing basis to
supervisors or regulators
• endorsing and implementing the FSF’s principles
on pay and compensation and supporting the
corporate social responsibility of all firms.
National supervisors are to ensure significant
progress in the implementation of the principles
by the 2009 remuneration round which require:
– boards of directors to play an active role in
the design, operation and evaluation of
compensation schemes
– compensation arrangements including
bonuses to properly reflect risk such that the
timing and composition of payments are
sensitive to the time horizon of risks.
Payments should not be finalised over short
periods where risks are realised over long
periods and
– firms to publicly disclose clear,
comprehensive and timely information
about compensation
• improving the quality, quantity and
international consistency of capital in the
banking system
• improving accounting standards on valuation
and provisioning, and achieving a single set of
high-quality global accounting standards
• extending regulatory oversight to credit rating
agencies. This regulatory oversight regime
should be established by late 2009 and should
assure the transparency and quality of the
ratings process.10
Risk management — board role
Poor risk management is identified in every report
regarding the financial crisis. Many companies in
Australia have spent the last few years upgrading
and implementing their risk management systems in
accordance with Principle 7 of the ASX Corporate
Governance Council Principles. The critical
importance of the company board accepting
responsibility for risk management is highlighted in
OECD reports:
The risk management systems have failed in many
cases due to corporate governance procedures rather
than the inadequacy of computer models alone:
information about exposure in a number of cases
did not reach the board and even senior levels of
management, while risk management was often
activity rather than enterprise based. These are
board responsibilities. In other cases, boards have
approved a strategy but then did not establish
suitable metrics to monitor its implementation.
Company disclosures about foreseeable risk factors
and about the systems in place for monitoring and
managing risk have also left a lot to be desired..
Stress testing and related scenario analysis is an
important risk management tool that can be used
by boards in their oversight of management and
reviewing and guiding strategy but recent
experience has shown numerous deficiencies at a
number of banks.11
Board sensitivity to risk management is
particularly important for companies with
international activities spanning different
jurisdictions where internal cross-border
communication can be quite a challenge. The
independence versus competence debate was
provoked again in the analysis of board failure in
the financial crisis, with suggestions that placing
independence above suitable qualifications led some
banks to have boards that lacked appropriate risk
management expertise.12 The Institute of
International Finance suggests that:
[b]oards need to be educated on risk issues and to be
given the means to understand risk appetite and the
firm’s performance against it. A number of members
of the risk committee (or equivalent) should be
individuals with technical financial sophistication
in risk disciplines or with solid business experience
giving clear perspectives on risk issues.13
Executive remuneration
As John Trowbridge of the Australian Prudential
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Table 2: Examples of regulatory models
Institutional Functional Integrated ‘Twin peaks’ Fragmented
China Italy United Kingdom Australia United States
Mexico France Germany Netherlands
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Regulation Authority (APRA) argued recently:
Investors and shareholders have become
concerned that executive remuneration
arrangements have contributed to risk-taking that
has undermined the quality of corporate
decisions and strategy, creating conflicts of
interest and compromising shareholders.14
At the OECD, executive remuneration has
been pinpointed as an area requiring regulatory
reform: 
The massive failure in corporate governance in
some companies reflects poor incentive structures
for decision making consistent with sustainable
corporate growth. The up-front fees and
remuneration systems based on recent
performance criteria could be important here, as
could the structure of the board and how they
manage risk. General principles and soft rules
implicit in self regulation do not seem to be
enough. This may require more ‘teeth’ to enforce
better governance. For example, the tax system
could be used to foster slow-vesting share
participation schemes instead of up-front cash
bonus payments (including for ‘retiring’
executives).15
Reflecting worldwide concern governments
have acted on executive pay. In February 2009 the
UK’s financial regulator, the FSA, published its
code of practice on executive remuneration.16 At
this stage, the code remains in draft form and it is
intended to apply to all FSA regulated firms. Its
focus on risk is reflected in the general principle:
‘Firms must ensure that their remuneration
policies are consistent with effective risk
management.’
In October 2008, APRA was asked by the 
Prime Minister to explore the issue of excessive
risk-taking, and published new guidelines in
February 2009. On 18 March 2009, the Treasurer,
Wayne Swan, and the Minister for Superannuation
and Corporate Law, Senator Nick Sherry, made a
joint announcement proposing reform of the
Corporations Act 2001 in respect of termination
payments. In May, the exposure draft
Corporations Amendment (Improving
Accountability on Termination Payments) Bill
2009 was released for consultation. The reform
proposal includes:
• reducing the cap on termination payments to
one year’s average base pay unless shareholder
approval is obtained
• extending shareholder approval requirements
to cover termination payments made to any
‘key management personnel’. Currently,
s 200B of the Corporations Act 2001 only
imposes the shareholder approval requirement
on payments made to directors 
• expanding the definition of ‘termination
benefit’ to catch all types of payments,
benefits and rewards given on termination.
The government referred the broader issue of
executive remuneration to its independent
advisory body, the Productivity Commission. In
April the Productivity Commission published its
issues paper on executive remuneration and
scheduled to release a final report in December
2009, which will examine:
• trends in director and executive remuneration
in Australia and internationally
• the effectiveness of the existing framework for
the oversight, accountability and transparency
of director and executive remuneration
practices
• the role of institutional and retail shareholders
in the development, setting, reporting and
consideration of remuneration practices
• any mechanisms that would better align the
interests of boards and executives with those
of shareholders and the wider community
• the effectiveness of the international responses
to remuneration issues arising from the global
financial crisis.
As an Associate Commissioner, Allan Fels is
widely expected to recommend a ban on the
practice of executives voting in favour of their
own remuneration packages. Another outcome
deemed likely is for shareholder approval to be
required for all equity grants to directors.17
For the last 20 years the inflation in CEO pay
unrelated to performance, and centred in the US,
has appeared unstoppable. Governments and
regulators have proved ineffective, shareholders
relatively passive, and boards complicit. But
executive reward has now crashed with the
market. This is a window of opportunity for
governments, regulators, shareholders and boards
to combine forces to reframe senior executive
schemes more realistically, based on long term
performance and sustainable strategies.
Ratings agencies
For some time, John Coffee has identified credit
ratings agencies as dubious gatekeepers of corporate
governance. Instead of monitoring rigorously the
growth of financial markets and instruments they
have become junior partners in this enterprise.
Coffee identifies several reasons for this.
• The lack of competition between agencies
(entrenched market duopoly of Moody’s
Investors Services and Standard & Poor’s
Ratings Services) has resulted in ratings being
sluggish to change, inaccurate and seldom
made to assist investors.
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• There is an inherent conflict of interest whereby
agencies receive 90 to 95 per cent of their
revenues from the issuers that they rate.
• They have limited capacity to understand the
underlying assets and cash flows involved in
complex structured finance products. Further,
they do not review how the risk profile of
products may change in different market
conditions.18
In response to the crisis, the US Securities and
Exchange Commission released a highly critical
report about ratings agencies proposing a set of
reforms that would regulate conflicts of interest,
disclosures, internal policies and business practices.19
Disclosure and accounting standards
There are many areas where regulators and other
bodies are considering ways to improve disclosure
and transparency. In the financial sector there is
much activity around improving disclosure
surrounding complex securitisation products. Also
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
is consulting on new rules for off-balance sheet
assets.20 The OECD research suggests that the
readability of risk disclosures is difficult and that
there is no consistent global set of accepted risk
management accounting principles.21
The FSF has called on the IASB to strengthen
international standards to achieve better disclosures
about valuations, methodologies and uncertainty
associated with those valuations.22 The accounting
standards must keep up with the complexity of
financial instruments. The International Auditing
and Assurance Standards Board is considering
enhancing guidance for audits of valuations of
complex or illiquid financial products and related
disclosures.23
In Australia the Corporations and Markets
Advisory Committee (CAMAC) released an issues
paper Aspects of Market Integrity. The paper responds
to a request made in November 2008 by Minister
Sherry, for CAMAC to provide advice by 30 June
2009 in relation to the effect of various market
practices on the integrity of the Australian financial
market:
• directors entering into margin loans over shares
in their companies
• trading by company directors in ‘blackout’
periods
• spreading false or misleading information
• corporate briefing of analysts. There are
concerns that confidential briefings are 
being provided to analysts which create the
perception that some analysts have access to
critical information that is not available to 
other analysts, shareholders and the general
public. 
These perceptions can lead to a lack of
confidence in the integrity of Australia’s
financial markets and potentially create
opportunities for insider trading.24
Conclusion
Blundell-Wignell et al in their report for the OECD
highlight the difficulties of regulating corporate
governance in competitive markets.
[T]he key regulatory issue that still confronts policy
makers... is one of understanding the business
model and corporate culture that always pushes risk
taking too far and results in periodic crises.25
Commentators have noted that many on the
inside knew the financial bubble could not last but,
like poker players at a table piled with money, they
were compelled to stay in the game when the only
sensible course of action would have been to walk
away. Certainly the influence of the efficient market
hypothesis that has informed regulators for two
decades has taken a fatal blow, as Alan Greenspan
the former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve sadly
admitted to Congress at the end of 2008, accepting
that the ‘whole intellectual edifice … collapsed in
the last year’.
Undoubtedly, markets in the future will be more
robustly regulated. We need to remember that we
need better regulation, not simply more regulation,
as Wehinger puts it: 
[R]egulators and policy makers have to keep in
mind that no regulatory system can ever be fail-
safe, and ‘good’ regulation has to strike a balance
between stability and growth, in supporting and
maintaining financial stability without stifling
financial innovation and growth.26
Boards and active shareholders must ensure that
excessive regulation is not the most evident result of
the financial crisis, by introducing and maintaining
the highest standards of corporate governance, risk
management and disclosure not only during these
difficult times, but when growth and confidence
return.
Thomas Clarke can be contacted on (02) 9514 3479 or
via email at t.clarke@uts.edu.au. Alice Klettner can be
contacted on (02) 9514 3080 or via email at
alice.klettner@uts.edu.au. 
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